



Co-Funded by the Internal Security Fund Police (ISF-P) Programme by the European Union

## EDURAD: Educational Responses to Extremism

---

**Full Title: EDURAD: ADDRESSING VIOLENT RADICALISATION: A MULTI-ACTOR RESPONSE THROUGH EDUCATION**

**Project Acronym:** EDURAD

**Project Number:** 871110 (ISF-P)

**Work Package 2**

**Output 2.4**

**Team Information:**

<b>Work Package 2.4</b> <b>Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (Netherlands)</b>	Stijn Sieckelink and Liam Stephens
--	------------------------------------

## 2.4 EDURAD MAPPING AND RESEARCH REPORT – The Netherlands



Co-Funded by the  
Internal Security  
Fund Police (ISF-P)  
Programme by the  
European Union

<b>EDURAD: EDUCATIONAL RESPONSES TO EXTREMISM</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>COUNTRY REPORT THE NETHERLANDS: POLICY AND RESEARCH ANALYSIS</b> .....	<b>4</b>
INTRODUCTION .....	4
POLICY CONTEXT AND SUMMARY .....	4
PVE-E RELEVANT POLICY DOCUMENTS .....	5
Van dawa tot jihad: De diverse dreigingen van de radicale islam tegen de democratische rechtsorde - 2004 [From Dawa to Jihad: The various threats of radical Islam against the democratic legal order] .....	5
Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan 2007-2011 .....	5
National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011-2015.....	5
The Netherlands Comprehensive Action Programme to Combat Jihadism. Overview of Measures and Actions.....	5
National Counterterrorism Strategy for 2016-2020 .....	6
<i>PVE-E Related Aims in Policy</i> .....	6
KEY STRATEGIES.....	6
<i>Signalling Radicalisation</i> .....	6
<i>Counter-messaging</i> .....	6
<i>Local intervention</i> .....	7
<i>Addressing social tensions</i> .....	7
KEY CONCEPTS.....	7
PEDAGOGICAL EXAMPLES OVERVIEW .....	7
EXAMPLES OF PEDAGOGICAL PRACTICE.....	7
Buro Zend-Uit .....	8
Ter Info .....	9
Formaat Stadsdialogen.....	10
Formaat in collaboration with Dock Youth Work.....	10
Fonds ZOZ & ZOZ Academy .....	12
Social Stability Expertise Unit (ESS) ft. JEP.....	13
DESCRIPTION OF FIELDWORK .....	15
<i>Ethics and Data Management</i> .....	15
<i>Participants and Procedure</i> .....	15
<i>Analysis</i> .....	16
<i>Defining Extremism</i> .....	18
<i>The Role of Education</i> .....	18
<i>The Nature of a Pedagogical Response</i> .....	19
<i>Support for Educators</i> .....	20
<i>Collaboration</i> .....	20
<i>Implications</i> .....	21
<i>The Nature of an Educative Response</i> .....	21

2

The European Commission's support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

## 2.4 EDURAD MAPPING AND RESEARCH REPORT – The Netherlands



Co-Funded by the  
Internal Security  
Fund Police (ISF-P)  
Programme by the  
European Union

<i>Different Roles in an Educational Response</i> .....	22
<i>Collaboration</i> .....	23
<i>Implications</i> .....	23
CONCLUSIONS OF THE COUNTRY REPORT .....	23



Co-Funded by the  
Internal Security  
Fund Police (ISF-P)  
Programme by the  
European Union

### Country Report The Netherlands: Policy and Research Analysis

---

#### Introduction

---

There is little in the way of stand-alone PVE-E policies in the Netherlands, however, educational implications can be traced through broader PVE related policies. Examining the historical evolution of PVE policy discourse in the Netherlands contextualises the role that education has been given within the broader strategies and approaches.

#### Policy Context and Summary

---

Since 2001 a number of key PVE-related policies have emerged in the Netherlands. In October 2001 the Dutch government rapidly launched the *Counterterrorism and Safety Action Plan*. While there were over forty diverse measures introduced in this plan, ‘preventing radicalisation’ did not feature. The focus was largely on extending the security apparatus, increasing restrictions and monitoring travel and finance. The terrorist attacks in Europe in 2004 and 2005, including the murder of the Dutch film-maker Theo van Gogh, brought the issue of ‘home-grown’ extremists to the forefront of concerns. In December of 2004, the national intelligence agency produced a significant report *From Dawah to Jihad* which offered a typology of eight forms of radical Islam that were deemed to undermine the democratic order. This explicitly placed the tackling of non-violent extremism on the table. In 2005, a government-wide approach to prevention was introduced, calling not only for government, but for society as a whole, to be involved in ‘preserving and creating an open, tolerant, and peaceful society’. This brought education into the realm of PVE, and this was consolidated in the *Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan (2007-2011)*. This action plan laid out a clear role for local governments to take a directive role in applying a combination of soft and hard measures in localities flagged as being vulnerable to radicalisation and polarisation. The plan called for the involvement of police officers, teachers, and youth workers in the signalling and prevention of radicalisation.

In the *2011-2015 Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, ‘Jihadism’ was placed firmly as the central terrorist threat facing the Netherlands. The narrowing of focus towards Islamic extremism evident in the 2011 strategy was further entrenched by the launch of the *Integral Approach to Jihadism Action Programme* in 2014. This emerged in the context of a rise in the prominence of foreign fighters leaving the Netherlands in 2013, and a report from the national intelligence agency describing a shift in the Netherlands from loose ‘Jihad networks’ to more connected, more prominent, networks. As with the previous policies the action programme consisted of both repressive and preventative measures, however in line with the hardened tone of this document, the repressive measures were leading. With the launching of the *National Counterterrorism Strategy 2016-2020* there was a re-broadening of focus beyond Jihadism, at least in the language used. While Jihadism was still described as the largest, and growing, threat to national security, attention was also drawn to a growth in other forms of extremism, highlighting far-right extremism in particular. This slight widening of focus is evident in the more general language of the prevention measures outlined. While the measures mirror the previous strategies – increasing resilience of vulnerable groups, early intervention, and counter-messaging – a notable difference is the lack of reference to any particular group or community targeted through these measures.

## 2.4 EDURAD MAPPING AND RESEARCH REPORT – The Netherlands



Co-Funded by the Internal Security Fund Police (ISF-P) Programme by the European Union

### PVE-E Relevant Policy Documents

<b>Name of policy</b>	Van dawa tot jihad: De diverse dreigingen van de radicale islam tegen de democratische rechtsorde - 2004 [From Dawa to Jihad: The various threats of radical Islam against the democratic legal order]
<b>Reference</b>	Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD). <a href="https://www.aivd.nl/documenten/publicaties/2004/12/23/van-dawa-tot-jihad">https://www.aivd.nl/documenten/publicaties/2004/12/23/van-dawa-tot-jihad</a> [Accessed 10/01/2020]
<b>Name of policy</b>	Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan 2007-2011
<b>Reference</b>	Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijkrelaties, <i>Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan 2007-2011</i> Den Haag: Colofon, 2007
<b>Name of policy</b>	National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011-2015
<b>Reference</b>	<a href="https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2011Z08288&amp;did=2011D20572">https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2011Z08288&amp;did=2011D20572</a> [Accessed 10/01/2020];
<b>Name of policy</b>	The Netherlands Comprehensive Action Programme to Combat Jihadism. Overview of Measures and Actions
<b>Reference</b>	<a href="https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2014/08/30/actieprogram-mema-integrale-aanpak-jihadisme">https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2014/08/30/actieprogram-mema-integrale-aanpak-jihadisme</a> [Date Accessed: 15/12/2019]

## 2.4 EDURAD MAPPING AND RESEARCH REPORT – The Netherlands



Co-Funded by the  
Internal Security  
Fund Police (ISF-P)  
Programme by the  
European Union

<b>Name of policy</b>	National Counterterrorism Strategy for 2016-2020
<b>Reference</b>	<a href="https://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen/nationale-contraterrorismestrategie/documenten/rapporten/2016/07/11/nationale-contraterrorismestrategie-2016-2020">https://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen/nationale-contraterrorismestrategie/documenten/rapporten/2016/07/11/nationale-contraterrorismestrategie-2016-2020</a> [Accessed: 10/01/2020]

### *PVE-E Related Aims in Policy*

There are two primary aims for education in Dutch PVE policies: i. building resilience to radicalisation and serving as a site for the early signalling and ii. flagging of potential instances of radicalisation. In the name of building resilience to radicalisation educational providers are called to teach critical thinking and media literacy, strengthen democratic awareness through citizenship education, provide resilience training, and draw on role models as examples for students. Reducing social tensions is also seen as a way of building resilience, and educational providers are expected to provide a safe space for young people to debate and discuss difficult issues, as well as promoting ‘underlying values’ and providing citizenship education. Flagging risk involves educators being trained to recognize possible signs of radicalisation and to make referrals to local government.

### **Key Strategies**

---

The nature of the preventive measures in national policy in national policies in the Netherlands can be captured in four broad lines:

#### *Signalling Radicalisation*

A number of the measures address the need to train Islamic clergy, teachers, and youth workers in being able to flag signs of radicalisation and having a clear infrastructure and procedure on when and where to turn to with these signals. In addition, the creation of a radicalisation hotline and a network for parents, broadens the possibility of signalling beyond professionals to include the general public and concerned family members. The signalling of signs of radicalisation is further strengthened through the development of an ‘expertise centre’ to monitor early signs of radicalisation and social tensions, and to train and inform professionals.

#### *Counter-messaging*

Strengthening counter-messaging efforts features strongly in the measures, including: i. addressing Koranic education to make it ‘more transparent and having a good pedagogical environment’; ii. the use of ‘key-persons’ within local communities to be an ‘alternative voice’; iii. the stimulation of networks and individuals who act as alternative voices; iv. countering jihadist messages and communicating positively about government policy.

## 2.4 EDURAD MAPPING AND RESEARCH REPORT – The Netherlands



Co-Funded by the  
Internal Security  
Fund Police (ISF-P)  
Programme by the  
European Union

### Local intervention

Preventive interventions are called for at the local level in areas deemed ‘at risk’. These interventions involve strengthening social infrastructure and local networks while applying the ‘personal approach’, part of which involve creating an alternative for young people at risk, such as a job, school, or sport.

### Addressing social tensions

A few measures are aimed at addressing social tensions, such as tackling Islamophobia, strengthening citizenship education, creating space to debate the limits of the rule of law so that ‘underlying values’ are ‘shared and propagated’ and exploring what it means to live together with differences.

### Key Concepts

Comprehensive – multi-agency – resilience – central coordination – local execution of policies  
Examples of Pedagogical Practice

### Pedagogical Examples Overview

An overall description or assessment of the pedagogical practices in the Netherlands is hard to make. In general, it is safe to say that most efforts relating to the prevention of extremism involve collaboration between different local partners whose primary work is in the domains of care, safety, or education. Apart from this, the country has welcomed several initiatives developed by NGOs, universities, and ministries that seem to be effective in tackling the kind of alienation that may lead youth into the open arms of extremist groups. Although the Netherlands has recently seen a remarkable increase of far-right extremist mobilisation, the emphasis in these educational programmes is mainly on tackling jihadism. Two national programmes, however, embraced pluriformity in this respect: the professional training programme *OMEI* (Omgaan met Extreme Idealen) that helps educators to deal pedagogically with strong idealism (from all ideological directions) amongst youth; and the *ZOZ-fund*, a cultural support programme established through collaboration of four ministries, in reaction to the societal polarisation following the wave of ISIS-inspired terrorist attacks, which is today directed at enabling young creatives outside of the cultural elites to tell their stories. Other programmes like *Formaat* and *Presikhaaf University* appear to be tackling all kinds of wellbeing related issues of youth and are temporarily integrated in counter-radicalisation policies. However, their strength derives from relating to the youth in the social-economic-cultural margins of society. While they help build resilience in youth by addressing identity struggles of their participants, they are better not reduced to ‘anti-radicalisation’ programmes. While several of these programmes can be developed in local collaboration between non-formal and formal educators, only one programme, *Ter Info*, is exclusively executed in the formal school context. This finding is consistent with the widely held assumption by Dutch youth professionals that tackling complex societal or developmental problems is an illusion unless one mobilizes professionals throughout the entire social-educational field.

### Examples of Pedagogical Practice

Country	The Netherlands, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
---------	---

## 2.4 EDURAD MAPPING AND RESEARCH REPORT – The Netherlands



Co-Funded by the Internal Security Fund Police (ISF-P) Programme by the European Union

<b>Project</b>	Buro Zend-Uit
<b>Website and date accessed</b>	<a href="https://www.burozend-uit.nl">https://www.burozend-uit.nl</a> / <a href="https://presikhaafuniversity.com">https://presikhaafuniversity.com</a> (accessed 15 July 2020)
<b>Field of Practice</b>	Youth work
<b>Primary Participants</b>	Youth vulnerable to antisocial pathways
<b>Pedagogical Strategies</b>	In a programme that was piloted in a city which has had more than its fair share of young individuals joining ISIS, vulnerable youngsters follow 5 simple steps to become more aware of their inner capacities and opportunities for personal growth. Following an invitation (1) and an informal 360 review by their closest elders and peers (2), the youth is invited by a social professional for a one on one interview about their capacities (3) and subsequently intensively supported and assisted in upgrading their life goals (4). This process is captured by the professional on the youth's phone camera (5). Following a pilot, the programme was rebuilt into an online tool that can be downloaded free of charge by youth workers and policy makers in PVE. The programme was co-developed with youth, youth workers, social designers and social researchers. Preliminary findings suggest that the programme in effect mirrors elements of the rites of passage evident in the journeys of foreign fighters (cf. Van San, 2019).
<b>Rationale for Approach</b>	Contemporary extremist groups such as The Islamic State In Syria and Iraq (ISIS) operate as semi-professional employment agencies for frustrated young people (Atran, 2015). They not only exploit vulnerabilities, but also talents and ideals (Sieckelinck, 2016). A threefold theory of change was formulated: 1. Anyone who gains insight into how he or she is perceived as a person by his or her close environment will find it easier to find his own talents. 2. Those who become more aware of their talents will do their best to show them and those who use their talents are more appreciated. 3. Those who feel valued are less susceptible to destructive solutions to problems and thus better able to cope with the temptations of crime and extremism.
<b>Key concepts</b>	Youth work – video production – Talent scouting - Rites of passage
<b>Significance for EDURAD project</b>	The findings have implications for the construction of programmes aiming to support young individuals in the development of their identity (and diverting them away from extremist ideology). These programmes should, as the saying goes, keep it simple and



## 2.4 EDURAD MAPPING AND RESEARCH REPORT – The Netherlands



Co-Funded by the Internal Security Fund Police (ISF-P) Programme by the European Union

	keep it real. Programmes should create a temporary safe space; avoid overly complicated constructions that distract or demotivate; approach youth as authentically as possible and offer sufficient space for their input.
--	--

<b>Country</b>	The Netherlands, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
<b>Project</b>	Ter Info
<b>Website and date accessed</b>	www.ter-info.nl (20 July 2020)
<b>Field of Practice</b>	Schools
<b>Primary Participants</b>	Pupils and students of primary and secondary schools
<b>Pedagogical Strategies</b>	Suppose a terrorist attack takes place, how do you discuss this as a teacher in a classroom full of young children? After the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015, terrorist expert De Graaf was frequently asked to speak at schools about terrorism, radicalisation and polarisation. This gave her the idea to develop the Ter Info teaching programme, a web app can be used as a tool to talk about terrorism with students in a way that is clear, fact-based and builds understanding. The app was created with Information Science, Educational Theory and History students at the University of Utrecht. Ter Info was created as part of the <a href="#">‘Utrecht zijn we samen’ taskforce</a> , in which de Graaf and Professor of Educational Theory <a href="#">Micha de Winter</a> advise the Municipal Executive of the City of Utrecht on combating polarisation and radicalisation.

## 2.4 EDURAD MAPPING AND RESEARCH REPORT – The Netherlands



Co-Funded by the Internal Security Fund Police (ISF-P) Programme by the European Union

<p><b>Rationale for Approach</b></p>	<p>TerInfo offers perspective through knowledge transfer (context, nuance and perspective). It is important to put terrorist attacks in perspective. This is done by not only paying attention to terrorism in the West, but also by devoting articles to attacks in African countries of the Middle East. In addition, terrorism is also placed in an historical perspective. That is why attention is paid to terrorist groups and attacks from the past and present. The purpose of this is to underline the transience of terrorist organizations and to illustrate the historical diversity of the phenomenon.</p> <p>TerInfo also pays attention to overarching questions that teachers and pupils often have. That is why you can find articles on TerInfo about how much we should fear terrorism, why people become terrorists and when someone is punishable.</p>
<p><b>Key concepts</b></p>	<p>Information – terrorism – schools – expert</p>
<p><b>Significance for EDURAD project</b></p>	<p>The programme demonstrates that schools are in need of information regarding terrorism. Also, preliminary findings show that students already know a lot about the topic and discuss terrorism on the playground. After the attack on a tram last year, the need for information about terrorism became even greater, says primary school teacher Remco van de Peut. "Terrorism is usually something that happens far away, but now it suddenly happened close to home, in Utrecht. The children had to stay inside that day and their parents had to come and pick them up from school. "It's actually pretty bad that we already have to teach children about terrorism. But if an attack has been committed somewhere, children often ask their teacher if they should be afraid", De Graaf says.</p>

<p><b>Country</b></p>	<p>The Netherlands, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam</p>
<p><b>Project</b></p>	<p>Formaat Stadsdialogen Formaat in collaboration with Dock Youth Work</p>
<p><b>Website and date accessed</b></p>	<p>www.formaat.org (20 July 2020)</p>
<p><b>Field of Practice</b></p>	<p>Youth work</p>

## 2.4 EDURAD MAPPING AND RESEARCH REPORT – The Netherlands



Co-Funded by the Internal Security Fund Police (ISF-P) Programme by the European Union

<b>Primary Participants</b>	Youth in the margins of society
<b>Pedagogical Strategies</b>	Formaat uses participatory theatre as a means of stimulating the political awareness of teenagers in the Crooswijk district of Rotterdam. It aims to address how young people can get a say in matters that play a role in their own neighbourhood. Through <a href="#">Participative Drama techniques</a> Formaat aims to give people the opportunity to develop strategies for life, to rehearse for reality, and to enter into dialogue with each other on an equal level. The tools that Formaat works with differ from those of classical theatre. The main focus is on activating the audience / participants: they play the main role.
<b>Rationale for Approach</b>	<p>Format uses participatory theatre to build an inclusive neighborhood in which everyone has a voice. Participatory theatre provides a common language that encourages connection, social action and social change. The Theatre of the Oppressed, developed by Augusto Boal, is the basic tool for the Jong Crooswijk trajectory. The marginalized neighbourhood is revalued as a social and cultural laboratory. The legislative branch of participatory theatre aims at improving decision-making and strengthens local democracy. As Theatre of the Oppressed is driven by and set up together with the people in disadvantaged positions, the necessary ideas and actions for change cannot come from the people in official (privileged) positions.</p> <p>Hence, this participatory theatre tackles victimhood: “The forum theatre is a very concrete practice that shows something of how people can be educated to transform from a spectator to an actor position, without turning to the position of superior and thereby condemning others to obedience. This has to do with the leading idea of dialogue, but also with the combination of reflection and action.” (Sieckelinck, 2017)</p>
<b>Key concepts</b>	Neighborhood – Participatory Drama – Youth – Civic Education
<b>Significance for EDURAD project</b>	The findings show, among other things, that accessibility and connection to existing networks are important success factors. Just like the involvement of 'role models', group leaders and speakers with the same cultural background as the participants. Meanwhile, it remains a social laboratory. The voice and actions of the group of young people are leading. Hence it is not always clear what exactly to expect. It would also be remarkable if everything went according to plan. Politically, young people are certainly activated, if only temporarily. It empowers people when they know that they are not alone in experiencing certain issues.

## 2.4 EDURAD MAPPING AND RESEARCH REPORT – The Netherlands



Co-Funded by the Internal Security Fund Police (ISF-P) Programme by the European Union

<b>Country</b>	The Netherlands, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
<b>Project</b>	Fonds ZOZ & ZOZ Academy
<b>Website and date accessed</b>	<a href="https://fondszoz.nl">https://fondszoz.nl</a> (20 July 2020)
<b>Field of Practice</b>	Culture and education
<b>Primary Participants</b>	Non-elite cultural creatives
<b>Pedagogical Strategies</b>	Established by the National Coordinator of Terrorism and Safety (NCTV), ZOZ Fund supports theatre makers, musicians, (short) film and documentary makers, photographers and online creatives who are committed to Dutch society today. Artists who want to strengthen resilience and reduce the breeding ground for extremism and radical ideas, regardless of the underlying vision, through their work. ZOZ Fund seeks and supports special stories in Dutch society. The focus is on projects aimed at reducing extremism, polarisation and radicalisation through the power of stories. This includes projects that try to bridge differences between people, to break through fixed frameworks and to stimulate empathy and understanding. The ZOZ Academy is for new artists who want to test an initiative or idea. Ten projects are selected each year that can participate in the Academy. They are given the opportunity to develop their concept into a first try-out, pilot or prototype with guidance (including content, marketing or distribution) and a financial contribution of a maximum of € 5,000.

## 2.4 EDURAD MAPPING AND RESEARCH REPORT – The Netherlands



Co-Funded by the Internal Security Fund Police (ISF-P) Programme by the European Union

<p><b>Rationale for Approach</b></p>	<p>Culture can make an important contribution to reducing social problems, by giving people the feeling that they are seen, taken seriously and feel valued. “We also need positive stories that act as an antidote. I call it the counter-narrative” says Chafina Bendaham, founder of Rose Stories, an organization that strives to make stories from marginalized groups in society visible and audible through various platforms (literature, theatre, media). Jacomijne Prins, sociologist and researcher, who intensively researched and followed a number of projects of the ZOZ Fund, concluded that the performance made many respondents feel (finally) seen/heard and thereby contributed to reducing a sense of alienation. An important criterion for approval is the quality of the plans for distribution and education in schools and other pedagogical settings.</p>
<p><b>Key concepts</b></p>	<p>Arts - diversity - funding – policy</p>
<p><b>Significance for EDURAD project</b></p>	<p>In a relatively short period of time, the ZOZ Fund transformed from a fund that focused on projects that aimed to get radicalised (Muslim) young people to change their minds, to a fund that focused on making the voices of marginalised groups heard in order to achieve more connection in society. Because social developments are moving fast, it is important to be flexible and to respond and respond quickly. The ZOZ Academy has developed in Amsterdam as a breeding ground for new talent. New talent is emerging and although the transfer to the ZOZ Fund and other funds initially started slowly, the amount of applications has accelerated since the beginning of this year. The aim is for the ZOZ Academy to develop into a connector between new target groups and the fund.</p>

<p><b>Country</b></p>	<p>The Netherlands, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam</p>
<p><b>Project</b></p>	<p>Social Stability Expertise Unit (ESS) ft. JEP</p>
<p><b>Website and date accessed</b></p>	<p><a href="https://www.socialestabiliteit.nl">https://www.socialestabiliteit.nl</a> / <a href="https://www.platformjep.nl">https://www.platformjep.nl</a> (20 July 2020)</p>
<p><b>Field of Practice</b></p>	<p>Youth professionals</p>

## 2.4 EDURAD MAPPING AND RESEARCH REPORT – The Netherlands



Co-Funded by the Internal Security Fund Police (ISF-P) Programme by the European Union

<b>Primary Participants</b>	Youth (care) workers, youth professionals in the broader sense
<b>Pedagogical Strategies</b>	The Social Stability Expertise Unit (ESS) is an action-oriented section of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. The Unit provides professionals with practical information on social issues and tensions, including radicalisation. It advises professionals on how to use this information and who to contact for assistance. One of the training programmes provided by the ESS is Omgaan met Extreme Idealen (OMEI). The OMEI training, which has reached 2000+ educational professionals since 2015, is aimed at equipping front-line professionals with pedagogical tools for dealing with possible signs of radicalisation. The training aims, from a pedagogical perspective, to provide front-line professionals with the necessary (basic) knowledge about the formation of ideals among young people and about radicalisation processes. It provides participants with tools for relating to young people with extreme ideals and informing them of the attitudes that are important in this regard (such as open communication, an investigative attitude, avoiding judgment and offering a counterweight).
<b>Rationale for Approach</b>	In 2017 the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Public Health produced the document ‘resilient youth, resilient professionals.’ This document, aimed at care and education professionals, provides extensive treatment of the issue of radicalisation, aimed largely at a pedagogical response to radicalisation. Building on the notion that clear social tensions are present in Dutch society, the report aims to prepare teachers to have difficult conversations about controversial issues. This is framed as a central strategy for preventing radicalisation, by removing the breeding ground for radical ideas. One of the recommendations in the report was to create a source of information and location for knowledge, expertise and interventions for professionals in the social domain. Hence, <i>Platform JEP</i> (Jeugd preventieve Extremisme en Polarisatie) offers a central place to professionals and volunteers with questions about polarisation, radicalisation and extremism.
<b>Key concepts</b>	Knowledge Exchange - Training - Schools – Polarisation

## 2.4 EDURAD MAPPING AND RESEARCH REPORT – The Netherlands



Co-Funded by the  
Internal Security  
Fund Police (ISF-P)  
Programme by the  
European Union

<b>Significance for EDURAD project</b>	In a recently conducted independent evaluation, The OMEI training is found to provide participants with more insight into the perception of young people with extreme ideas, their own associations and prejudices regarding ideals and radicalisation and the way in which both aspects can influence conversation with young people. Platform JEP supports professionals and volunteers with knowledge, advice, information and action perspectives. Central to this are issues related to working with young people who are at risk of radicalizing and working on social cohesion. It targets all professionals and volunteers who work directly with and for young people and therefore also have an educational task. These include youth workers, mental health professionals, social workers, employees of branch organizations, community police officers, youth probation officers, youth guardians, and representatives of religious organizations, youth organizations, sports organizations, cultural organizations, policy makers and officials of municipalities.
--	--

### Description of Fieldwork

---

#### *Ethics and Data Management*

The research plan satisfied all conditions of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam ethics approval process. All data collected through the questionnaires was entirely anonymous with no personal data collected.

At the beginning of the focus group sessions verbal consent of all participants was obtained, both to participate and for the session to be recorded. The sessions were recorded using the Zoom record function directly to the researcher's computer. The video and audio recordings were then transferred to a secure university server accessible only to the researchers. Transcriptions of the focus group are also stored on the secure server.

To comply with research integrity standards, on publication of the research, transcripts will be archived on the DarkStor secure server for 10 years.

#### *Participants and Procedure*

Data were collected through an online questionnaire and two online focus groups. The selection of participants for the questionnaire aimed to ensure that a cross section of individuals involved in questions around education and PVE could be reached. This included teachers, youth workers, social workers, policy makers, and other practitioners such as mental health practitioners who work in educational environments.

## 2.4 EDURAD MAPPING AND RESEARCH REPORT – The Netherlands



Co-Funded by the  
Internal Security  
Fund Police (ISF-P)  
Programme by the  
European Union

As the Netherlands already has a number of networks of practitioners involved in PVE, participants were primarily recruited through these existing networks. Respondents were also encouraged to share the invitation with other practitioners with whom they are in contact. In total 97 invitations were sent out and 47 responses were received.

For the focus groups, participants were recruited around two grassroots informal educational practices in two different Dutch cities. We aimed for participants from different sectors and practices who work around the same geographic location, including policymakers, youth workers, teachers, and youth involved in the practices. In total 13 people participated in the focus groups, 3 in the first and 10 in the second.

Given the current conditions with raising cases of Covid-19, focus groups were conducted online using Zoom. The sessions of the focus groups were recorded and transcribed.

### *Analysis*

A thematic content analysis of the questionnaire data was conducted in order to identify key themes emerging across the questionnaires. A second reading of each questionnaire was conducted through the lens of these key themes to identify areas of consensus and divergence on these themes. Given the small sample size, analysis of the questionnaire did not aim at generalizable conclusions of Dutch educator perspectives on PVE-E. Rather the questionnaires were used as an exploratory tool to identify a range of issues and themes worthy of further exploration, in regards to PVE-E.

The focus groups sought to provide further context and deeper probing of some of the issues identified in the questionnaires. A thematic content analysis was conducted on the focus group transcripts. Key themes emerging in the initial analysis were compared between focus group participants and between the two focus groups as a whole. Areas of consensus were highlighted and divergent perspectives identified.

### **Short summary and analysis of findings from questionnaires**

---

Forty-seven respondents completed the online questionnaire. Participants came from a range of practices, including nine teachers, three youth workers, and six policy makers (Figure 1). Over half of the respondents have over ten years of experience in their practice, with only two having less than 3 years of experience (Figure 2).

### *Area of Expertise*



## 2.4 EDURAD MAPPING AND RESEARCH REPORT – The Netherlands



Co-Funded by the Internal Security Fund Police (ISF-P) Programme by the European Union

### 2. Wat is uw hoofdberoep of belangrijkste praktijk waarin u actief bent?

[More Details](#)

● Leerkracht / docent	9
● Schoolmedewerker	0
● Beleidsmaker	6
● Jongerenwerker	3
● Sociaal werker	6
● (Inter)levensbeschouwelijk pro...	1
● Coach / mentor	2
● Other	27




Figure 1

### Professional experience

### 3. Hoeveel jaar ervaring heeft u in dit domein?

[More Details](#)

● 1-2	2
● 3-5	11
● 5-10	9
● 10+	25




Figure 2

### Types of intolerance encountered.

Respondents reported encountering a wide-range of forms of intolerance in their practice (Figure 3), with the most common being racism (89% of respondents) followed by religious intolerance (70%), with 'Alt-right' the least commonly reported (34%).



Co-Funded by the Internal Security Fund Police (ISF-P) Programme by the European Union

7. Komt u een van onderstaande tegen in uw praktijk?

[More Details](#)

● Racisme	42
● Islamofobie	30
● Jihadisme	22
● Hate speech	20
● Uiterst-rechts extremisme	21
● Alt-right	16
● Fundamentalisme/Dogmatisme	24
● Homofobie	28
● Sexisme	25
● Religieuze intolerantie	33
● Other	10




Figure 3

*Defining Extremism*

In determining what should be considered extremism, there was a general consensus amongst respondents that the characteristics of an extremist position include being blinded by ideology, having an intolerance for difference, and viewing the ‘other’ as an enemy. For some this was conceptualised as denouncing constitutional democracy. Another lens through which extremism was defined was the impact of such a position - that is whether it was damaging to others or damaging to the individual.

There were some points of divergence in the classification of different positions as extremist or not. While half of the respondents regarded fundamentalism and dogmatism as a form of extremism, the other half rejected this, arguing that it was possible to be fundamentalist and dogmatic without being extremist. Similarly, there was some disagreement as to whether sexism and homophobia should be considered extremist. While some felt they should, others argued that sexism and homophobia are not damaging to constitutional democracy, and therefore whilst they are undesirable, they are not forms of extremism. Notably, racism, although frequently picked, was not seen as inherently extremist by a third of the respondents.

These divergences seem to reflect the distinction made between cognitive vs. behavioural extremism - that is, the distinction between extremism defined by the thoughts and ideas held (cognitive), or by action (behavioural). The majority of respondents adopted a behavioural view, that to be considered extremism involves not only holding intolerant beliefs, but also carrying out actions that undermine democratic order.

*The Role of Education*

There was a general consensus amongst respondents that education has a role to play in preventing extremism. It was generally seen that within the structure of a preventive approach, education has a specific role to play. This was largely described in terms of primary prevention, focussing on the importance of socialising youth in democracy - something that was argued to be best achieved through education. A developmental approach was evident in most of the responses, arguing that addressing



Co-Funded by the  
Internal Security  
Fund Police (ISF-P)  
Programme by the  
European Union

issues early, broadly, and educationally is the most effective. In the words of some respondents: “You shouldn’t wait until someone radicalises”; “They are kids still in development, you need an educational approach”.

Despite this general consensus, some teachers pushed back at this suggestion, arguing that there is so much in the work of a teacher, preventing extremism shouldn’t be on their plate. Interestingly, while many in the informal education sector felt that schools should be doing more, in general policy makers argued that youth workers are more central in this work than schools. The suggestion made was that youth workers are in a better position than schools to address these issues.

It is worth noting the comment of one respondent - that they regard the prevention of radicalisation as a natural by-product of their social-educational activity, and certainly not its main goal. They suggest that this is possible precisely because the work is *not* labelled as or seen as being involved in PVE.

This position is also reflected somewhat in the notion of what is unique about an educational response. While, according to the respondents, other (non-educational) stakeholders regard the prevention of terrorist attacks and less nuisance overall as a marker of success, this is not the goal or outlook of an educational response. Rather than negating the possibility of attack, the role of education is cast as one of socialisation and identity building, which serves to prevent attraction to violent extremism, but this is not its primary goal. As one respondent expressed it, education needs to work around issues of radicalisation “without measuring success in the way other stakeholders do”.

### *The Nature of a Pedagogical Response*

One of the most striking outcomes of the questionnaire was the difficulty respondents had in articulating what a pedagogical response to extremism should be. While many could fluently describe their perspective as to what constitutes extremism, and stated that education should play a role in prevention, when it came to describing what this educational response should look like, nearly half of the respondents provided little or no response.

Of those who did provide a response, three broad categories of pedagogical response were identified: 1. Promoting critical thinking and dialogue. 2. Focusing on understanding what is behind the behaviour and words rather than the words/actions themselves 3. Ensuring young people come into contact with difference. While one respondent brought together the first two responses, these were generally distinct perspectives.

The focus on critical thinking, dialogue, and conflict resolution mirrors much of what can be found in policy documents in which emphasis is given to providing young people with the tools and skills to be able to analyse different ideas and make an informed judgement about the beliefs they adopt. This tends towards a largely cognitive/rational response, in which the role of education in preventing extremism is to ensure young people are equipped to reject narrow/harmful ideologies.

The second category conceived of the pedagogical response to extremism as distinctly relational rather than rational. In the words of some respondents: “you shouldn’t focus too much on what they say, it is

## 2.4 EDURAD MAPPING AND RESEARCH REPORT – The Netherlands



Co-Funded by the  
Internal Security  
Fund Police (ISF-P)  
Programme by the  
European Union

often more emotionally driven than ideologically driven”, “even though their behaviour looks ideologically driven they do this to compensate for personal failure”. Another participant cautioned against taking a too verbal or rational response, that this could in fact be counter-productive. From this perspective, much attention was given to building safe and trusting relationships with young people, listening without judging the person, and focussing on trying to understand the underlying cause of the behaviour shown or words expressed. Some described the importance of helping youth to feel that they matter. At its core this perspective located the pedagogical response in alleviating conditions that may give rise to young people embracing seemingly extremist ideas and actions as a result of underlying insecurities or frustrations.

A related line that emerged in two responses was the importance of addressing the issues of trauma, stressing the importance of creating safe spaces for young people to talk about things they have been through.

The final category of response focussed on the role of education in ensuring young people are exposed to difference and come into contact and have a chance to connect with ‘the other’. This could be seen as a manifestation of contact theory - in which exposure to difference is suggested to ameliorate fear of, and dehumanisation of, other groups.

It is notable that while these broad-brush categories of response emerged, few of the respondents provided solid, concrete examples of what a pedagogical response would really look like.

### *Support for Educators*

It was striking that across the board there was the feeling that there was no lack of support available to educators. There was a general consensus that training works and is helpful to teachers. However, there were some caveats to this. First, the content of the training was seen to be important, and some respondents expressed a desire for training that not only provided knowledge and information, but also addressed attitude. They expressed interest in training that would assist them with knowing how to react in different situations, not just in terms of *what* is said, but in their attitude. Second, a number of respondents expressed some dissatisfaction with specialist commercial providers of training that focus on understanding Jihad. It was expressed that these were financially costly, and that such training would be better provided by the government. Finally, some respondents raised the issue of online behaviour and the support required to address this. Respondents expressed the difficulty of monitoring and supporting the use of online environments and called for an instrument to assist in navigating this challenging area.

### *Collaboration*

There was a clear consensus that collaboration is very important in PVE. Some expressed the feeling that collaboration has improved over the years as schools, regional safety offices, police, and youth work have been engaged in collaboration in this for a longer time.

There were some areas concerning collaboration that were raised for improvement. Some called for local government to be better in recognising the value of youth work and not securitising the work of this



Co-Funded by the  
Internal Security  
Fund Police (ISF-P)  
Programme by the  
European Union

sector. Others sought more collaboration with sports associations and with religious providers, such as local mosques. The media was mentioned as a partner in the sense that they have an impact on young people - yet they were seen as a hard partner, they make the work of prevention more difficult.

### *Implications*

One of the clearest and most striking outcomes with regards to the EDURAD project from this questionnaire was the challenge in articulating a concrete notion of a pedagogical response to extremism. While the importance of education seemed undeniable to most, what this actually meant in terms of pedagogy was far less clear. The three categories of educational response, critical thinking/dialogue, relational/affective, and contact provide interesting starting points for furthering a conversation on PVE-E pedagogy.

### **Short summary and analysis of findings from focus groups**

---

The two focus groups provided an opportunity for participants to explore in more depth the role of education in PVE and more particularly the question of collaboration between different sectors.

The focus groups brought together different practitioners and policymakers who work around different groups of youth in two different cities in the Netherlands. The nature of the conversation was therefore localised and contextualised in each setting. The aim was to explore these issues concretely rather than in the abstract.

### *The Nature of an Educative Response*

In light of the results of the questionnaire it is interesting to note that in both focus groups the essence of an educative response involved safe and trusting relationships in which underlying issues could be addressed and strengths built upon. However, there were differences between the two groups.

In the first, youth workers articulated a clear pedagogical vision - that of participatory theatre - suggesting that by engaging with their affective life through these methods, young people were able to articulate and work through deeper emotional issues. It is notable that this was seen as a very specific way of dealing with the affect which they distinguished from efforts to deal with emotions such as recommending boxing or emotion regulation training. It hinged on the quality of the youth workers having a deep understanding of the reality of the lives of the young people and having their own 'life experience' that went beyond 'book learning'. Further, the vision of a successful outcome within this context was less about being able to regulate emotions and more about being able to channel and even take an activist position towards social injustices.

There is an important caveat to this - while the youth worker expressed the importance of young people being able to take a critical position, a youth within the focus group placed more emphasis on the ability to be flexible and compromise. In his own words: "When I look around me, this is what youth do, and what they have become very good at". However, as this was explored further in the conversation it became clear that this was a form of response that needed in the current social circumstances, but that



Co-Funded by the  
Internal Security  
Fund Police (ISF-P)  
Programme by the  
European Union

this was not necessarily what he saw as desirable or helpful. He went on to describe that this focus on flexibility meant youth took on different personae in different settings, but that in a “free country” you should be able to “present as the person that you are”.

In the second, the focus was on building a safe environment in which young people can come into contact with different stakeholders. The importance of exposing youth to difference was explicitly outlined, with creating multiple opportunities for meeting a specific strategy taken. From this perspective, within an open and safe environment, in which the talents of young people are recognised and highlighted, it becomes possible to delve into more difficult issues. As with the first, the quality of the relationship between youth and practitioners was a forefront concern. In this second focus group, however, even more emphasis was given to the environment - that a condition was a loving environment - or in the words of the respondents themselves “a loving nest” into which young people can fall back when they hit a setback or make a mistake.

### *Different Roles in an Educational Response*

In order to stimulate discussion on the roles of different actors, respondents were asked to provide their own ending to sentences about what role each played. As an example, “A youth worker who contributes to the resilience of young people towards violent radicalisation is someone who...”.

Clear consensus emerged in both groups on the role of policy makers and youth workers. The recurring theme from all respondents (including a policy maker) was that policy-makers need to have their “feet in the clay”. The qualities of policy makers in this regard were of a good understanding of the lives of young people. In the second focus group this was given more concrete expression by one of the respondents who saw the role of policy makers as ensuring there was space for all the different voices of the city to be heard at the table.

There was also clear consensus around the characteristics of a youth worker working around questions of violent extremism. These revolved largely around the nature of the relationship they should be able to build. Key characteristics of this were the ability to stand next to the youth through whatever happens, the ability to listen without judgement, and to stimulate and support questioning of choices without judging the choices young people make. In the words of one respondent: “the youth worker is present and is part of the life of the youth”.

The role of school teachers stimulated a more diverse discussion. At the heart of the discussion was the extent to which teachers are able to create the kinds of relationships with young people that were felt to be essential to dealing with issues around violent extremism. Opinions varied with some respondents remarked that a ‘teacher is always a teacher’, that there is always some element of this relationship that is hierarchical and obligatory. Indeed, one respondent commented that the nature of this relationship means that it can be counter-productive rather than constructive in the life of a young person grappling with difficult issues. This was contrasted with the voluntary nature of the relationship with youth workers. Other respondents commented that they had seen some teachers being able to form such relationships, and that they are in a unique position of interacting with *all* young people, and that they spend thirty hours a week with them. Some respondents pointed to specific characteristics that would assist teachers



Co-Funded by the  
Internal Security  
Fund Police (ISF-P)  
Programme by the  
European Union

in working around issues of violent extremism: the ability to self-reflect on their own attitudes, ideas and topics they feel strongly about themselves, and an understanding of why young people might be attracted to radical or extreme ideas.

### *Collaboration*

A key theme that emerged was that collaboration can be difficult due to fear. Fear about the topic of violent extremism could lead to over-reactions on the one hand or a hesitancy in recognising and acknowledging issues when they arise. Notably, this was the perception youth workers had of the response of teachers. In such a setting, where there is panic or fear around an issue, teachers may be quick to flag up something as worrisome, which youth workers would then find themselves dealing with, but in a calm and 'normal' way. In these instances, the relationship between schools and youth workers was seen less as collaboration around a shared vision, and more youth workers taking up and dealing with issues that schools were responding to in an unhelpful manner.

In the first setting, collaboration was also challenging as the educational vision of the youth workers tended towards promoting activism, which could hit up against the goals and vision of other stakeholders. However, it is worth noting that in the space of the focus group in which a policy maker and youth worker were sitting together, the possibility for space for different yet complementary goals and approaches by different stakeholders seemed to find some expression.

In the second setting in which there is a longer established and more formal form of collaboration between youth work, police, and schools on issues around violent extremism, it was noted that collaboration had become easier over time. Collaboration had worked most effectively in this setting when all involved "enhance one another's expertise...the more you get to know each other the more you can succeed in your goals".

### *Implications*

Through the two focus groups we can trace two distinct strands of thought as to what makes for an educational response to extremism. The first focussed on empowerment for activism, the second focussed on the importance of strong and loving networks in which young people's talents can find expression. However, it is notable that both give a prominent space to emotions. The two focus groups seem to show two sub-types of educational response that foregrounds the role of an affective dimension. Critical thinking was distinctly in the background of these perspectives.

### **Conclusions of the Country Report**

---

Confronted with politically motivated violence since the turn of the century, The Netherlands has developed five defining policy programmes on countering terrorism and tackling radicalisation. Since the third programme was launched in 2007, there was a role for education in preventing radicalisation. While the exact role of formal education has remained largely unarticulated so far, several practices were initiated in the non-formal social-educational domain. Some national and some local educational programmes were developed based on the perceived needs in the field and the insights from academic





Co-Funded by the  
Internal Security  
Fund Police (ISF-P)  
Programme by the  
European Union

research. Although the knowledge base for de-securitised approaches was already available, political and societal pressure made it hard to develop non-securitised approaches towards youth education. This stalemate situation was solved with the twofold decision by the social affairs ministry to 1. Install an outreaching team to support schools and municipalities with their task in maintaining social stability and 2. Let them organize the distribution of the youth professional training OMEI (dealing with extreme ideals) on a wide scale.

Consistent with the results of our fieldwork, educational professionals see their role in tackling radicalisation above all in inter-professionally co-creating a warm relational environment where youth feel safe to air (frowned upon) views or (suppressed) feelings, so that these can be addressed and possibly questioned. At the same time our findings indicate a challenge in articulating a concrete notion of a pedagogical response to extremism. However, the three categories of educational response that emerged - critical thinking/dialogue, relational/affective, and contact - provide interesting starting points for furthering a conversation on PVE-E pedagogy. The two focus groups revealed two distinct strands of thought as to what makes for an educational response to extremism. The first focussed on empowerment for activism, the second focussed on the importance of strong and loving networks.

Moreover, the following pedagogical challenges and opportunities deserve further exploration:

- Professionals' incapacity to address online behaviour of youth
- Their desire to be part of a community of practitioners with a special interest in societal-educational topics

Regarding the first: youth spend between two and eight hours a day online. More specifically, marginalized youth use new interactive media for the consumption, expression, and exchange of experiences and ideas. As this takes place in a world that is generally not interested in their views (unless they predict risk), use of social media is of huge importance for the participants in the described programmes. As a result, one may expect youth professionals to have minimal awareness of this dynamic and skills to be present online in a constructive way. Unfortunately, while many professionals realize the importance of online activity, they feel that they lag behind in understanding and dealing with the online lifeworld of their youth.

The second need derives from the fact that practitioners learn more and better in communities of (peer) learners. Even in the eyes of the most motivated professionals, the training programmes should do more to stimulate discussion and support amongst teachers and youth professionals. Therefore, we see great potential in establishing communities of practice

As over the years, thousands of Dutch professionals have been made more aware of their educational role in tackling extremism, growing up and teaching has arguably become more complex than before. Radicalisation, which is presented in the abovementioned training programme *OMEI* as a wicked problem, requires professionals who are capable of attentive listening, of empathic feeling, and of not judging, not forcing, and not panicking. While these may seem personality traits that one may have or may not have, the professionals in our sample explicitly ask for more training opportunities to practice these skills and attitudes. The success of these training programmes will depend greatly on demonstrating that



## 2.4 EDURAD MAPPING AND RESEARCH REPORT – The Netherlands



Co-Funded by the  
Internal Security  
Fund Police (ISF-P)  
Programme by the  
European Union

responding to extremism is an educational task. An educational response that, apart from the necessary cognitive information, foregrounds the affective dimension enables practitioners to navigate the highly politically sensitive minefield of tackling extremism by staying true to their calling: helping and supporting youth to get through adolescence without too much damage and most of their ideals intact.